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ABSTRACT
The present moment of deep transition, as well as
being a time of danger, presents an opportunity for
positive renewal. This paper develops a model of
deep institutional innovation at times of historic
change such as the present and outlines a research
agenda aimed at initiating a holistic assessment of
the main foundational institutions in society and re-
imagining them in ways that will allow them to ful-
fill their basic ethical and effectiveness functions.
Such a fundamental critique and re-imaging, the
paper argues, is essential if global challenges are to








Social Institutions in a Time of Deep Transition
We are in a moment of deep institutional breakdown. Climate change,
environmental degradation and a biodiversity crisis, marked increases in
inequality, economic crises, the rise of populism, rising geo-political ten-
sions, the effects of increased globalization, and ongoing religious and
ethnic conflicts provide clear evidence that current social institutions are
not optimal, either for human flourishing or for addressing global chal-
lenges. The coronavirus pandemic has brought this dangerous reality into
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even starker relief, as it highlights both the deep interconnectedness and
the sheer fragility of our globalized socio-economic-environmen-
tal system.
This deep interconnectedness and complexity extend across multiple
domains, including techno-economic, ecological, political and ethical. The
aforementioned crises and problems, oftentimes framed as “grand
challenges” within technical and engineering discourse, require
approaches and re-imagined institutions which radically go beyond the
mere technical or economic (Cech, 2012). Instead, the types of multi-level
and transcendent problems which encompass such systems can be
described as “wicked problems,” a term first coined by Horst Rittel and
Melvin Webber, where they described these as complex messy problems
where “there are no “solutions” in the sense of definitive and objective
answers,” and which even elicit broad disagreement in their framing
(Rittel and Webber, 1973). Such problems, layered with complexity,
require multiple systemic responses, extending beyond reductionist sci-
ence and accompanying “command and control,” managerialist concep-
tions of reality. Instead, any productive and purposeful engagement with
grand challenges requires an appreciation and embrace of their system
complexity, inherent uncertainty and a post-normal approach to science
(Ravetz, 1999, 2006).
In this context, this paper focuses on the role of social institutions,
and institutional values, in either perpetuating current dysfunctions or
facilitating progressive global change. It argues that, due to a confluence
of circumstances, many of the foundational social institutions upon which
societies have relied for decades for stability and direction, including eco-
nomics, democracy, technology, religion, gender, and higher education,
are currently failing.
The paper argues that this moment of deep transition (Kanger &
Schot, 2019), as well as being a time of danger, presents an opportunity
for positive renewal. For such positive renewal to occur, however, existing
social institutions must be critiqued and re-imagined. Following Eisler
and Fry (2019), we argue that this re-imagining needs to be based on a
shift in the underpinning values that animate the major social institutions
that make up society, from dominance values of hierarchy, inequality,
coercion and private gain, toward partnership values of equity, cooper-
ation, and public good.
The paper begins by outlining the definition of social institutions as
meta-institutions (i.e. systems of organizations) that are of central import-
ance to a society. The paper then develops a model of change in social
institutions at times of historical transformation. Our model posits that
deep societal transformations occur at specific moments in history when
underlying changes lead to tipping points that necessitate systemic
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change. It is the premise of this paper that we are now at such a histor-
ical tipping point.
The outline of the paper is as follows:
Section “Theoretical Approach—Social Institutions and Historical
Transformative Change” develops a framework for understanding the
complex processes underpinning change in major social institutions at
moments of historic transformation, such as the present. It identifies a
number of sources of toxicity that, if they are not constrained, are
likely to steer the coming societal transformations in destruc-
tive directions.
Using this framework, Section “Core Functions of Social Institutions
and the Definition of a ‘Good’ Social Institution in Times of
Transformative Change” identifies three core functions of social institu-
tions in times of transformative change and posits a definition of a
“good” social institution that will help steer social transformations in the
direction of fairness, sustainability and public good.
Section “Critique of Neoliberal Economics” applies this definition of a
“good” social institution to critique the current dominant neoliberal eco-
nomic paradigm.
Section “Outline of a Proposed Research Agenda” then proposes a
broader research agenda aimed at similarly critiquing and re-imagining
the existing social institutions of democracy, religion, gender, technology
and higher education, as guides for their progressive transformation.
This historic moment of deep change also requires new imaginaries to
guide the direction of societal transformation. Section “Re-imagining
Global Society” briefly outlines our ambition, based on the project’s find-
ings across social institutions, to generate new and inspiring visions to
guide global transformation at this historic moment of both great danger
and exceptional promise.
Defining Social Institutions
The literature distinguishes between two different accounts of institutions.
Atomistic theories (e.g.,, Taylor, 1985) identify institutions with relatively
simple social forms such as conventions, social norms or rules. According
to Hodgson (2015, p. 501), for example, institutions are “integrated sys-
tems of rules that structure social interactions”. Rational choice theory,
which is a constituent part of modern economic theory, is perhaps the
best-known contemporary example of atomism.
By contrast, holistic theories, including structuralist-functionalist
theories, stress the inter-relationships of institutions (structure) and their
contribution to more complete social complexes, especially soci-
eties (function).
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While there is no single definitive definition of social institution, this
paper adopts the following broad characteristics of social institutions:
they play a central and important role in society; they are typically meta-
institutions, i.e., systems of organizations; and being central and import-
ant to a society, they are usually long lasting, typically trans-generational
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Social institutions in the sense
being used in this paper are distinguished from less complex social forms
such as conventions, rules, social norms, roles and rituals. The latter here
are considered to be among the constitutive elements of social institu-
tions. Hence this paper is adopting a structuralist-functionalist view.
At the most general level, the main social institutions are family,
education, religion, economy and government. These social institutions
are, almost by definition, characterized by historical continuity, pattern
maintenance and social reproduction, rather than by change, innov-
ation or transformation. The current paper, however, is interested in
exploring the processes of deep structural and functional change within
social institutions at historic tipping points. Such exploration requires,
by necessity, a deep historical, cross-disciplinary, comparative perspec-
tive in order to escape prevailing paradigms and to envision and chart
a path toward possible alternative social institutional configurations.
This paper will focus, in particular, on the social institution of eco-
nomics. In addition, it will map out a possible future research agenda
that would also include democracy, religion, gender and higher education.
It will also argue for the inclusion of technology as a critical social insti-
tution, one that is currently transforming each of the other institu-
tions considered.
Theoretical Approach—Social Institutions and Historical
Transformative Change
This section develops our theoretical approach to change in large complex
social systems in historical moments of transformative change. Our model
of change has three components.
First, we consider the dynamic interactions between “leaders-followers-
context” to be at the core of institutional change. We draw on the models
of Kellerman (2012) and Padilla et al. (2007), taken from the literature on
business and management, which view both leaders and followers as
embedded in specific contexts or environments. This triangular model
emphasizes the critical influence of societal and organizational context in
affecting followers’ demands and expectations and in empowering par-
ticular types of leaders. Change within this “leaders-followers-context”
complex can, and typically does, occur without causing deep transform-
ation of the social system of which it is part.
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The second component of our model of change asserts that at particu-
lar historical moments, changes within the “leaders-followers-context”
complex reach tipping points at which deep transformation can occur.
Such moments of change, characterized by the breakdown of social insti-
tutions, are periods of liminality, extreme contestation, social unrest and
deep institutional innovation.
In our analysis, we draw on Plato to embed the “leader-follower-con-
text” triangle within this broader historical framework for social systems
change. The central argument of Plato’s Republic is that history is not lin-
ear and progressive, but is instead characterized by periodic degenera-
tions, recurrences, and reversals, which can culminate in transformations
of entire social institutions and societies. Plato allows an interpretation of
the “leader-follower-context” triangle not simply as ongoing, and poten-
tially reversable, shifts between different leaders and power groupings, but
as transformations of the entire “leader-follower-context” system between
different system configurations—from democracy to tyranny, to oligarchy,
to aristocracy, for example. Deep institutional innovation therefore only
occurs, following Plato, at specific moments in history.
The third component of our change model moves from considering
the dynamics of change to identifying sources of toxicity, (or alternatively
sources of flourishing/wellbeing), in social system change. It is notable
that the literature focuses predominantly on sources of toxicity, rather
than on sources of flourishing. We argue that at times of deep social
change, the dominance of particular forms of toxicity can steer the trans-
formation in a direction that is detrimental to the public good. Three
complimentary sources of toxicity are considered. First, Plato in Republic
identifies “pleonexia,” an anthropologically and psychologically deep-
seated hunger for power and wealth, as the source of toxicity in social
change. Second, Girard et al. (2003) draw attention to the fact that
humans are imitating creatures and in imitating other people’s desires we
end up as rivals. Such mimetic rivalry, for Girard, is a source of toxic
change in social systems. The third source of toxicity explored is the fixed
psychopathology of a minority within the human population, specifically
those individuals with psychopathy and narcissistic and paranoid person-
ality disorders (Hughes, 2018). These sources of toxicity, if not con-
strained, can lead to transformation of social institutions in directions
which are detrimental to the public good.
The “Leaders-Followers-Context” Triangle
We begin by drawing upon two related models used to describe systemic
interactions between leaders, followers and context (or environment),
namely Kellerman’s leadership triangle and Padilla et al.’s model of the
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toxic triangle, both of which are found in the literature on leadership
and management.
Kellerman and Padilla Et Al
There is a widespread sense in contemporary society that not only
individual leaders, but the entire leadership class has failed. According
to Kellerman, “… government and business are suffering from a near
breakdown in their capacity creatively and collaboratively to effect poli-
cies to address the most pressing of the nation’s problems” (Kellerman,
2012, p. xix). Many leaders have been exposed as deficient on the two
central criteria of leadership, namely ethics and effectiveness.
Kellerman calls this phenomenon, “the end of leadership” and asserts
that it has undermined the ability of leaders to effect fundamen-
tal change.
Kellerman explains this crisis of leadership in terms of the dynamics
of the triangle comprising leaders, followers and context (Kellerman,
2012, p. xxi). Over recent decades, the cultural context has changed in
ways that have undermined the authority of leaders while empowering
followers. Two factors have contributed to this power shift. The first is
the historical trend toward democracy, equality and inclusion. This trend
has reduced the distance between leaders and followers, and in doing so
has reduced leaders’ authority and power. The second factor is informa-
tion and communication technologies. This too has affected leadership
and followership by diminishing the former and empowering the latter.
Social media, for example, empowers everyone to express their opinion
and voice their demands. The dissemination of classified information that
exposes corrupt or dishonest behavior of leaders, by Wikileaks for
example, has also served to undermine leaders’ credibility in the minds of
many citizens.
According to Kellerman, “… weakened leaders, alienated followers
and an array of apparently intractable problems. This constitutes the con-
temporary context…” (Kellerman, 2012, p. 83). To address this, she sug-
gests that a paradigm shift is needed away from leader-centrism to an
understanding that all three sides of the triangle of leaders, followers and
context have equal weighting. This would require a greater emphasis on
the importance of contextual intelligence, a shift in emphasis from devel-
oping good leaders to addressing the problem of stopping bad leaders,
and a focus on educating “good followers.”
Padilla et al.’s model of the “toxic triangle” also focuses on the sys-
temic interaction of leaders, followers and context, and in particular on
the circumstances that give rise to “destructive” leadership. According to
Padilla, “destructive leadership entails the negative consequences that
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result from a confluence of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and
conducive environments” (Padilla et al, 2007). The basic premise of this
model is that in order attain positions of authority, destructive leaders
need both a core base of followers and an environment that supports
their rise to power. Padilla et al.’s analysis identifies five characteristics of
destructive leaders: narcissism, charisma, personalized use of power, nega-
tive life themes, and an ideology of hate. Their model also identifies four
environmental factors that enable destructive leadership: instability, per-
ceived threat, cultural values, and the absence of checks and balances,
such as strong institutions.
Padilla et al. assert that whereas instability and weak institutions can
enable the emergence of bad leadership, effective institutions, system stability,
and proper checks and balances, can serve to deter bad leaders from emerg-
ing, and constrain their destructiveness if they do rise to power (Padilla et al.,
2007, p. 186). Reflecting Kellerman’s injunction on the need for “good
followers,” Padilla et al. also argue that developing strong followers, by pro-
moting a culture of empowerment, is important in constraining a toxic lead-
er’s destructiveness (Hollander & Offermann, 1990).
Plato—A Long Term Historical Perspective
The second component of our model of change asserts that at particu-
lar historical moments, changes within the “leaders-followers-context”
complex reach tipping points at which deep transformation can occur.
This second component, which we draw from Plato, embeds the tri-
angular models above within a broader historical framing. Kellerman’s
work, it can be argued, may be viewed as embedded within a linear-pro-
gressive conception of history, whereby societies become progressively
more democratic and egalitarian and “good” leadership plays a crucial
role in ensuring such progress. The central argument of Plato’s Republic,
in contrast, is that history is not linear and progressive, but is instead
characterized by periodic degenerations, recurrences, and reversals, which
are experienced as transformations not only between different forms of
leadership but between different types of society.
In Republic, Plato posits that Aristocracy (leadership by wise kings)
degenerates and transforms into, or is overthrown and replaced by,
Timocracy (heroic military leadership). This in turn consolidates, but
over time transitions into Oligarchy, which is leadership by family
descendants, estates, businesses and other wealthy elites associated with
and inherited from the military heroes. In turn, Oligarchy grows increas-
ingly corrupt and is eventually overthrown by Democratic revolution,
which installs leadership by the demos.
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Within a Democracy, however, Plato, like Kellerman, asserts that as
everyone becomes more equal, leadership becomes increasingly difficult.
As popular demands grow, citizens become ever more dissatisfied with
the performance of their leaders. During periods of acute crisis, with no
ordinary leader being seen to be capable of delivering on their demands
and expectations, the democratic masses become susceptible to electing
charismatic, “strongman” leaders. Such leaders however, Plato warns,
soon become Tyrants who overthrow Democracy and restore, once again,
a pseudo-Aristocracy of “wise kings.” According to Plato, at specific
moments in history, such deep innovations in entire social institutions
can be expected to occur.
Sources of Toxicity
Plato
Plato’s “Republic” gives an account not only of the transformation of
societies, but also of the potential source of toxicity during periods of
transformation. According to Plato, this source is what the Greeks called
“pleonexia,” an anthropologically and psychologically deep-seated hunger
for power, wealth and other social goods. According to the ancient
Greeks, pleonexia is always present in history and social relations, a latent
propensity, “hard wired” in human appetites and competitiveness, and all
historical societies have needed to control and to govern it by one means
or another. Under conditions of crisis and uncertainty, however, pleo-
nexia may be unleashed, resulting in the rise of destructive leaders on a
wave of mass support, and the potential transformation of societies in a
direction that is detrimental to the public good.
Girard
A closely related, and complimentary, way to formulate the source of tox-
icity at times of deep social change is with the help of Rene Girard’s the-
ory of “mimetic rivalry,” and a contagious downward spiral of
“scapegoating violence.” According to Girard’s mimetic theory (Girard,
2003), imitation is a key characteristic of human beings and is a basic
mechanism for learning, in so far as we imitate what we see others doing.
Girard, however, draws attention to the fact that we also imitate other
people’s desires, and in doing so may end up desiring the very same
things, thus becoming rivals. Girard distinguishes “imitation” from
“mimesis.” The former refers to the positive aspect of reproducing some-
one else’s behavior, whereas the latter implies the negative aspect
of rivalry.
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Girard’s eschatology, in “Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the
World,” echoes Plato’s critique of democracy in Republic, and
Kellerman’s concerns regarding the “end of leadership,” namely that
equality undermines the authority and effectiveness of leaders. In a
Girardian interpretation of Kellerman’s leadership triangle, the shorter
the side of the triangle linking leaders and followers becomes, the more it
tends to generate a downward spiral of envious mimesis, violence and
disorder. According to Girard, mimetic rivalry’s propensity for contagious
violence can be limited by elevating a Subject(s)/Leader a great distance
above other subjects, so that rivalry amongst the masses is mediated
through an external model, who cannot be envied, only revered. In this
way, a “strongman” leader quells mimetic rivalry and restores order.
Hughes
A third potential source of toxicity is the fixed psychopathology of a
minority within the human population. Hughes (2018) identifies the per-
sonality disorders of psychopathy, narcissistic personality disorder and
paranoid personality disorder, which together affect around five percent
of the general population, as being a potential source of toxicity at times
of crisis. The characteristic traits of individuals with these pathologies
include the demand for complete subordination, paranoia, the vilification
of opponents, narcissistic rage when challenged, reckless risk taking, and
an inability to change course even in the face of imminent disaster.
Individuals and groups with these disorders have a higher chance of ris-
ing to power at times of crisis than those with healthy psychology. Once
in power they can transform social institutions toward more destructive
forms from within. Hughes also draws on the leadership triangle of
Kellerman and Padilla et al. to explain the dynamics that enable toxic
leaders to rise to power, namely when a conducive environment induces
a critical mass of followers to support a psychologically pathological
leader. In “Disordered Minds” (2018), Hughes highlights the role of social
institutions as either an enabler of, or a check on, the rise to power of
such destructive leaders, with a particular focus on democracy as a
defence against their dangerous psychopathology.
Core Functions of Social Institutions and the Definition of a
“Good” Social Institution in Times of Transformative Change
Our model of deep institutional innovation posits that societal transfor-
mations occur at specific moments in history when underlying changes in
the dynamics of “leaders-followers-context” lead to tipping points that
necessitate deep systemic change. At such historical moments, the
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prevalence of particular sources of toxicity, if they are not constrained,
can tip the balance of the transformation to outcomes that are severely
detrimental to the public good.
It is the premise of this paper that we are now at such a historical tip-
ping point. Many of the social institutions that comprise contemporary
society are no longer fit for purpose and are breaking down. These social
institutions urgently need to be reimagined and reconstituted to constrain
sources of toxicity and direct the coming transformations in construct-
ive directions.
In the following section, we discuss three core functions of social
institutions in this time of deep societal transformation. Based on these
core functions, we formulate a definition of a “good social institution”
applicable to our current historical moment. These core functions are:
setting societal rules and norms of behavior; enabling “good” and
deterring “bad” leadership; and possessing the capacity for
“progressive” change.
In the context of today’s grand societal challenges, the paper adopts an
explicitly normative approach by considering “positive” transformation to
be in the direction of advancing toward the goals of sustainability and
human flourishing as reflected in the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change and the United Nations Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable
Development Goals. The paper’s normativity is thus grounded in well-
established international agreements and laws.
The Importance of Social Institutions in Setting Societal Rules and
Norms of Behaviour (Eisler and Fry)
Our model of deep institutional change follows Eisler and Fry (2019) who
characterize social systems as lying on a continuum between domination
systems and partnership systems.
According to this formulation, social systems based on domination are
characterized by the following: rigid top-down rankings, including the
ranking of one form of humanity over another; cultural acceptance of
abuse and violence; beliefs that rankings of dominance are inevitable and
even moral; and use of fear and force to preserve structural violence
embedded within the system.
Partnership systems, by contrast, are characterized by the following:
democratic and egalitarian values and social practices; cultural rejection
of abuse and violence; beliefs about human nature that support equality,
compassion, caring and cooperation; and equal status for men and
women. This last point includes the valuing, in both women and men, of
qualities and behaviors, such as nonviolence and caring, that are
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denigrated in the dominance system as being exclusively “feminine”
(Eisler & Fry, 2019, p. 99).
Eisler and Fry assert that contemporary society is marked by a struggle
between dominance systems and partnership systems within every major
social institution in society, a struggle that is, at root, a struggle between
value systems (Eisler & Fry, 2019, p. 296). While no social institution ori-
ents completely toward either end of the spectrum, the degree to which it
aligns one way or the other profoundly effects the rules, norms, beliefs
and practises that are enforced by that social institution.
With regard to leadership, Eisler and Fry emphasize that partnership sys-
tems are not free of hierarchy. Instead the hierarchies that do exist are gener-
ally used to empower followers. Similarly, partnership systems are not free
from conflict. Rather conflict is acknowledged and dealt with nonviolently
through debate and mediation. As a result of their inclusiveness, social insti-
tutions biased toward the partnership system have a greater tendency to be
oriented toward the common good. (Eisler & Fry, 2019, p. 103)
In adopting Eisler and Fry’s formulation, we suggest that whereas their
continuum between “domination” and “partnership” suggests a dualism,
we posit a dialectic, so that any particular institutional configuration will
represent a compromise between these opposite tendencies.
Social Institutions as Enablers of “Good” Leaders and Deterrents of
“Bad” Leaders (Hughes)
As Kellerman argues, contemporary society is characterized by failures of
leadership, as evidenced by widespread loss in trust in leaders and ubiqui-
tous examples of unethical and ineffective leadership, across a wide range
of contemporary social institutions.
Hughes (2018) argues that social institutions, including their value sys-
tems, can play a critical role in containing “bad” leadership by preventing
individuals with destructive personality disorders, namely psychopaths
and those with narcissistic and paranoid personality disorders, from rising
to leadership positions. He outlines, for example, how the modern system
of liberal democracy can be seen to be comprised of six pillars, or con-
straints, each of which acts as a defence against the abuse of power by
pathological leaders and elites. These constraints are political participation
through democratic elections and direct participation of citizens in gov-
ernment; the rule of law applied equally to all; constitutional constraints
on the power of government; a prohibition on the imposition of state
sponsored ideology; social democracy to ensure social stability; and the
protection of fundamental human rights through international law
(Hughes, 2018, p. 121). Hughes argues that in the struggle described by
Eisler and Fry, between “those trying to move towards partnership and
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those pushing us back to rigid rankings of domination” (Eisler and Fry,
2019, p. 296), pathological individuals can play a catalytic role in tipping
the balance toward destructive transformations. A core function of social
institutions at times of transformative change is therefore to act as a con-
straint against such individuals’ toxicity.
Capacity of Social Institutions for “Progressive” Change
A third critical function of social institutions in times of transformational
change is to enable “progressive” change and prevent “regressive” change
that would result in harm to public good.
At this point, we find it useful to also draw on the field of institutional
economics, which places values at the core of institutional change.
According to institutional economics, the process of institutional
change comes about as a result of a change in society’s “value structure.”
According to Tool (2018), individuals can act in accord with culture, hav-
ing internalized its values and practices, and in doing so perpetuate the
status quo. Alternatively, individuals can act to change culture, by critic-
ally assessing and acting to change existing values and practices. The
reflective capacity of individuals and groups to critically evaluate the sta-
tus quo and determine whether or not it is suitable to meet the contem-
porary needs of society plays a major role in institutional change (Bush,
1987, 2015).
An institution’s capacity to allow such critical reflection to take place,
however, depends on the balance within the institution between what
Ayres (1944) calls ceremonial valuation and instrumental valuation. In
ceremonial valuation, innovations are judged not on the basis of their
consequences, but on their conformity with authority, tradition and ideol-
ogy. In instrumental valuation, by contrast, new ideas are tested based on
evidence as to whether or not they will bring about desired change.
While instrumental valuation is open-ended, ceremonial valuation is
bounded by existing authority and dogma. According to Foster (1981), all
institutions perform both ceremonial and instrumental valuations. The
more ceremonial valuation dominates instrumental valuation, however,
the greater the resistance to change within the institution.
In this paper, following Eisler and Fry, we posit that progressive
change is (in large part) change in the direction of the “partnership sys-
tem,” while regressive change is change in the direction of the
“dominance system.” We posit therefore that the capacity of a social insti-
tution for “progressive” transformation is determined both by its existing
values and norms as well as its capacity to reflect on its existing values
and practices.
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In forwarding this premise we do not wish to suggest that ceremonial
valuation, based on authority and tradition, is of no value. We do wish to
argue, however, that critical engagement with authority and tradition is
necessary in the context of deep social change. This is particularly
important when authority and tradition empower values that are detri-
mental to the public good.
Definition of a “Good” Social Institution in Times of Deep
Transformative Change
The considerations above allow us to tentatively suggest a definition of “a
good social institution” in times of transformative change. Our definition
has three broad components that relate to the three core functions of
social institutions outlined above.
Based on these essential functions, we define a good social institution
as one that: (i) sets rules and norms of mass behavior based predomin-
antly on partnership values rather than dominance values (ii) serves both
to empower positive leaders, (who are both ethical and effective), and
constrain negative leadership, and (iii) enables progressive change toward
solving the grand societal challenges facing humanity.
This definition of a good institution places values of justice and sus-
tainability, ethical and effective leadership, and the ability to drive positive
institutional and societal change for the common good, at the heart of
good social institutional design.
It should be noted that in applying this definition, we assert that the
principles inherent in the definition will manifest in different ways
depending on specific local cultures and circumstances. This definition is
therefore offered as a prism, rather than a “one-size-fits all” prescription
for progressive social institutional change.
Critique of Neoliberal Economics
In this section of the paper, we apply the definition of a “good
institution” to the social institution of contemporary neoliberal econom-
ics. This analysis takes as its starting point the report “Beyond Growth”
(OECD, 2019a) produced for the New Approaches to Economic
Challenges unit at the OECD, which provides an authoritative critique of
the existing dominant economic paradigm. This report identifies a range
of failures in the existing dominant neoliberal paradigm, the sources of
those failures, some emerging new approaches, and the need for deep




The NAEC report (OECD, 2019a) points to a range of systemic failures
of the current dominant economic paradigm in many OECD countries
both prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis. (The report pre-dates the
COVID-19 pandemic). The following features are identified: income
inequality and wealth inequality have risen (Alvaredo, 2018); living stand-
ards for many are barely above those of a decade ago (OECD, 2018;
OECD, 2019d); under-employment and insecure and precarious work
have increased; the gap between richer regions and those on the periph-
ery has widened; public and private debt is high (OECD, 2019b); product-
ivity growth has slowed (OECD, 2015) and innovation is no longer being
diffused to the rest of the economy (OECD, 2019c); and economic growth
remains dependent on emergency measures such as ultra-low interest
rates and expanded central bank balance sheets.
Largely as a result of these failures, popular discontent with politi-
cians and the political system has risen (OECD, 2017); trust in estab-
lished institutions, in experts and “elites” has declined (OECD, 2017);
and social cohesion has been eroded, with many countries experiencing
increased cultural as well as economic divisions (World Bank, n.d.).
The report concludes, “[m]any of the policies which have been imple-
mented across the OECD, not just over the last decade but over the last
forty years or so, appear no longer able to improve economic and social
outcomes in the ways they once promised.” (OECD, 2019a, p. 4)
Sources of Failure
In terms of diagnosing the source of these ills, the NAEC project, based
on a range of expert input from diverse sub-fields of economics, identifies
a wide range of problematic structural issues. These issues include the
growth of financial capitalism; the concentration of market power, which
has reached near monopoly levels in numerous sectors of the global econ-
omy, particularly in digital technology; the model of shareholder primacy
as the dominant model of the firm; the focus of governments on GDP,
despite widespread acknowledgement that GDP is not an adequate meas-
ure of well-being; the retreat of the state in favor of the market; and the
dependence of economic growth on unsustainable practices such as fossil
fuels, forms of intensive and meat-based agriculture, and the unlimited
exploitation of global natural resources.
To this, we add taxation and revenue, of particular contemporary sali-
ence in the context of globalization, as the essential structuring matrix of
most other modern social institutions, and the bridging mechanisms
between “economy” and “democracy.” While societies remain localized, in
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the context of globalization many economic activities have become dis-
embedded and trans-national, depriving national governments of the rev-
enue required for the social institutions upon which social cohesion
depends. Following Elias and Jephcott (1982), who characterized the
French Revolution as essentially a tax revolt, past social revolutions,
including the 1930s “New Deal” in the United States and the European
social welfare state model, involved deep innovations in taxation and rev-
enue. The neoliberal revolution and the proposed “New Green Deal” can
similarly be seen, in large part, as existing (and failing), and proposed
future, configurations of taxation and revenue respectively.
Emerging New Approaches
In response to these systemic failures, the NAEC report notes that new eco-
nomic theories and policy directions have emerged that are challenging the
current paradigm.
Within mainstream economics itself, significant changes are taking
place. These include, for example, the recognition of the “social” human
being as an important economic agent, in acknowledgement of the fact
that people do not act solely in their own self-interest but can also act in
caring, co-operative and altruistic ways (McGregor & Pouw, 2017). The
role of power in the shaping of markets is receiving more attention,
including the impact of corporate lobbying on regulatory policymaking
and the impact of such activities on inequality (Boushey, 2019). The det-
rimental impacts of “financialisation,” including the role of speculative
and short-term financial trading, investment in real estate, and the rise of
the “shadow banking” system, are also the focus of increased attention
(Lazonick, 2014; Kay, 2012; Nesvetailova, 2019).
Nontraditional strands of economics have also emerged to challenge
some of the basic assumptions of the dominant paradigm. Ecological eco-
nomics, for example, seeks to bring the economy back within the earth’s
“sustainability limits” or “planetary boundaries,” and in doing so is chal-
lenging the notion of economic growth itself (Hickel & Kallis, 2019;
Jackson, 2018; Steffen et al., 2015; Victor, 2019). Feminist economics is
expanding the boundaries of the economy by including the critical role
which unpaid caring work, carried out mainly by women, plays in society
(see, e.g., Folbre, 2008; Himmelweit, 2002; Waring, 1988). Some political
economists are arguing for an overt acknowledgment of the ethical nature
of economics and a more sophisticated public debate about the justice, or
otherwise, of different economic institutional arrangements (Sandel, 2012;
Sandel, 2013; Komlos, 2019). And there is also a growing recognition that
the narratives which are commonly accepted in society about how the
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economy works, and how people behave in it, themselves influence indi-
vidual and mass behavior (Shiller, 2019).
The Need for Deep Institutional Innovation Based on a Shift
in Values
On the basis of their analysis, the NAEC report concludes that the deep
challenges facing OECD economies today will not be addressed simply by
incremental changes to existing policies, but that instead fundamental
structural changes will be required. The report points out that such deep
institutional innovation happened twice in the last century (Laybourn-
Langton & Jacobs, 2018): first, in the 1940s, in the aftermath of the Wall
Street Crash and the Great Depression, when the economic orthodoxy of
laissez faire was replaced by Keynesian economic theory and the develop-
ment of the welfare state; second, when this “post-war consensus” itself
broke down amid the economic crises of the 1970s, and was replaced by
the free market or neoliberal model developed by economists such as
Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek.
According to NAEC, “[m]ore than a decade after the financial crash, with
the global economy and many individual OECD countries facing multiple
crises, our argument is that the time is ripe for another such paradigm shift”
(OECD 2019a, p. 21)
For the purposes of this paper, what emerges clearly from the NAEC
analysis is that the emerging direction of change in this paradigm shift is
from Eisler and Fry’s dominance system to the partnership system. This
is evident in a wide range of policy proposals that have become the sub-
ject of intense economic and political debate, even before the COVID-19
pandemic, including:
 the need for the state to play a more assertive role in prioritizing
sustainability and the protection of social cohesion alongside eco-
nomic growth
 the need to reverse the dominance of the financial economy, rela-
tive to the real economy, to reduce inequality and economic
instability
 the need to reduce corporate monopoly through the application of
effective anti-trust law, and more assertive state policies governing
fair tax payments and the protection of public goods
 the need for governments to move beyond GDP and adopt a wider
set of measures of economic and social progress and wellbeing as
the aims of economic policy
 the need for new models of the firm which balance the pursuit of
profit with the pursuit of broader social and environmental goals
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 the need for a new culture of globalization that is supportive of
global convergence between developed and developing nations,
both as a moral objective and as a necessary precursor for address-
ing challenges including pandemics, climate change, war and ter-
rorism, and
 the need for ethical leadership and corporate governance as the
foundation of future economic, environmental and social progress.
In summary, the evidence presented in the NAEC report points to
the potential for deep institutional innovation away from the values
and structures of the current dominant economic paradigm toward
greater distribution of power, greater emphasis on cooperation and
inclusion, and a shift in values from private gain to public good.
Outline of a Proposed Research Agenda
Critique of Existing Institutions
In this section, we briefly outline a proposed research agenda aimed at ini-
tiating a holistic assessment of the main foundational social institutions in
society and re-imagining them in ways that will allow them to fulfill their
basic moral and functional roles, and in doing so contribute to a positive
transformation of society toward sustainability and human progress.
We agree strongly with Eisler and Fry that understanding the inter-
relatedness of social institutions is key to understanding human societies
and that at this moment in history, such a systemic analysis is essential
(Eisler & Fry, 2019, p. 11). We, therefore, assert that such a research
agenda cannot consider individual institutions in isolation. Instead, simul-
taneous critical analysis and re-imagining of each of the major institu-
tions in society is required.
A preliminary analysis of the social institution of economics has been
presented above. This analysis serves as an initial outline of how a cri-
tique and re-imagining of key institutions might be approached. As our
example illustrates, the research agenda we are proposing would draw on
critiques and re-imaginings that are emerging in response to current cri-
ses. The possible elements of such a programme have also been sketched
in our example above, namely an authoritative critique of the existing
institutional paradigm, a comparison of the existing institution with our
definition of a “good institution,” and the re-imagining of possible new
social institutional paradigms in closer accord with the principles underly-
ing our definition of a “good social institution.”
We propose that this research agenda would cover not only economics
but would also encompass democracy, religion, gender, technology, and
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higher education. This section briefly outlines the rationale for focusing
on each of these particular social institutions.
Democracy
Within the political arena, several wealthy, supposedly “consolidated”
democracies are currently experiencing significant and unexpected setbacks
in democratic institutions and practices, while progress toward democracy
has been stalled or reversed in many emerging and developing nations
(Wike & Fetterolf, 2018). World Values Survey (WVS) data document
declining support for democracy and growing support for nondemocratic
forms of government among the publics of several established democracies.
This is reflected in the rise of right-wing populist nationalist parties across
many established democracies, which has resulted not only in the erosion
of democratic norms and institutions, but also in an alarming increase in
identity-based hate speech and hate crime. The rise in nationalism has also
led to a dangerous erosion in international cooperation and a deterioration
in the capacity of international organizations to facilitate the global cooper-
ation needed to address urgent global challenges.
Religion
The major world religions face fundamental questions in the context of glo-
balization and global challenges (Ott, 2007). Planetary wide human migra-
tion, whether voluntary or coerced, changes in gender roles and norms, the
future evolution of “homo techno-sapiens,” environmental destruction and
mass species extinction, are just some of the ongoing disruptions that are
challenging existing religious paradigms. Globalization and human migration
require a cross-cultural consensus about the fundamentals of life as a regula-
tive idea. Education needs to address issues of gender equality, advocacy for
children and future generations, and ethical responsibility to others in order
to reduce inequalities and resolve global challenges. The dialectic between
religion and science needs to produce scientifically informed communities
and ethically informed technologies. In this context, world religions face ten-
sions between the extent to which they are acting as a practical force for social
change toward sustainability and fairness, and the extent to which are they
responsible for producing and maintaining existing injustices and unsustain-
ability. According to Eisler and Fry, the extent to which world religions can
act as ideological and practical forces for social good will depend in large part
on the deconstruction of domination narratives in religion and an increased
emphasis on the partnership-oriented narratives that promote a more ethical
morality and spirituality.
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Gender
Gender equality, and the social construction of gender, is a pervasive
issue across all of the major social institutions in society (Smiler, 2019).
Gender equality requires systemic changes to eliminate the many root
causes of discrimination that still curtail women’s and girls’ rights and
flourishing in private and public spheres. The majority of the world’s
poor are women. Gender-based violence remains one of the most perva-
sive human rights violations in the world, while women commonly face
higher risks and greater burdens from the impacts of climate change. In
politics and business, women still hold less than a quarter of parliamen-
tary seats globally and less than a third of senior and middle management
positions in the private sector. In economics, women conduct over two
and a half times more unpaid care and domestic work than men. A new
construction of gender is urgently needed that is less destructive to both
women and men and which could provide the basis for transformations
toward more ethical and sustainable societies.
The University
Existing models of education are increasingly failing to meet the chal-
lenges facing societies today, including technology, migration, climate
change and increasing polarization and inequality. Higher education plays
a foundational role in terms of enabling (or preventing) deep system
change. One of the primary functions of the University is ‘the reproduc-
tion of elites’ in the professions, in political and business leaders, science,
and the arts and humanities. The University can either replicate the status
quo in terms of paradigms of knowledge, epistemology, methodologies,
etc. or can act as an enabling institution, from within which deep system
change may emerge (Kamola, 2014). The organization of academic insti-
tutions into specialized academic disciplines has led to very significant
scientific, technical, cultural, and societal progress. However, the increas-
ing compartmentalization of knowledge has become, in certain situations,
an obstacle to addressing sustainability challenges. Steering society toward
a more sustainable path will require a more transdisciplinary research
approach where academics collaborate with practitioners and others out-
side of academia, including society at large (Dedeurwaerdere, 2014).
Technology
Green technologies lie at the heart of the transitions needed to address
societal grand challenges, such as climate change, biodiversity loss and
environmental degradation. These sustainability transitions will require
global cooperation to enable the change from existing unsustainable
socio-technical systems (such as existing food, energy, heating and
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transport systems), to more sustainable configurations. Such “system
innovation” involves a diverse range of new technologies, multiple stake-
holders, requires numerous systemic policy interventions, and is inher-
ently highly uncertain. Current levels of global cooperation and
investment, however, are well below those needed to avoid potentially
devastating levels of global warming, environmental destruction and
human harm. At the same time, new technologies, such as digital technol-
ogies and biotechnologies, are beginning to disrupt our current ways of
living in ways we cannot yet fully predict. New and emerging technolo-
gies have far reaching implications for issues such as health, privacy,
equality, and social cohesion. According to Jasanoff (2016), this range of
issues raises fundamental questions as to whether existing social institu-
tions are capable of deliberative, ethical, future making in the face of
accelerating technological change.
Re-imagining Global Society
This historic moment of deep transformational crisis requires not only
fundamental innovations in all the major social institutions that make up
society, it requires new imaginaries to guide the direction of those trans-
formations. Most difficult of all, it also requires, as the President of
Ireland, Michael D. Higgins stated in his address to the United Nations
General Assembly in 2019, the consciousness to bring about the necessary
changes in our economic, political and social lives (Higgins, 2019).
As well as critiquing and re-imagining individual social institutions,
therefore, our proposed research agenda, would also address systemic
issues, such as the dynamic interactions between social institutions and
the meta-level outcomes that result. One particular aim in this regard is
the generation of new global imaginaries. According to Steger (2019),
imaginaries are belief systems, institutions and practices that promote
specific ideas and values that guide human communities. Taylor (2004)
asserts that social imaginaries come into being as ideas initially held by
elites that eventually spread into the wider public through their material
instantiation, through which they influence law, government, institutions,
and social practices. Such imaginaries, produced and reproduced within
contested political, economic, and religious institutions, can constitute
powerful forces capable of affecting profound social change. Examples of
contemporary social imaginaries include neoliberalism, feminism and
environmentalism. Steger further cites imperial globalism, market global-
ism, justice globalism, jihadist globalism, and right-wing nationalism as
currently existing competing and co-existing global imaginaries.
In addition to critiquing and re-imagining the individual social institu-
tions of economics, democracy (see e.g. Little and MacDonald, 2013),
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technology, religion, gender and the university, the proposed research
agenda would also aim to assess the emergence of possible new global
social imaginaries that could empower and enable the global transition to
sustainability and a more just and equal world (see, e.g., Wahlrab, 2019).
Conclusion
The paper has presented a model of deep institutional innovation at times
of historic change such as the present, and outlined a potential research
agenda aimed at initiating a holistic assessment of the main foundational
institutions in society and re-imagining them in ways that will allow
them to fulfill their basic ethical and effectiveness functions. Such a re-
imaging, the paper argues, is essential if challenges ranging from climate
change to species extinction and environmental damage, democratic
decline, rising social unrest and inequality, among others, are to be faced
and addressed.
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